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An Alternative Neo-Kohlbergian 
Approach in Social Pedagogy
Terje Halvorsen
Abstract
In many countries social pedagogues apply ART (Aggression Replacement 
Training), a multimodal programme designed to help juveniles with 
severe behaviour problems. In this programme Lawrence Kohlberg’s 
theory of moral development makes up an important element. The first 
part of this article offers a presentation of Kohlberg’s theory and some of 
the critique made of it. The second part describes how the Kohlbergian 
tradition is implemented in ART. In the final part of the article a problem 
with the ART programme is pointed out and an alternative neo-Kohlber-
gian approach is described. This method may prove to be a viable 
approach in the field of social pedagogy and an adequate supplement to 
the ART programme.
Keywords
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socio-cultural perspective; ethics
Kohlberg and His Critics
Lawrence Kohlberg’s theory of moral development was launched in 
a post-war context. After the Second World War a large number of 
atrocities were reported. Some of these were committed by people 
claimed to be more or less ordinary human beings. Most famous in 
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this respect is Hannah Arendt’s (1963) description of the war criminal 
Adolf Eichmann, the man who headed the transportation of Jews to 
concentration camps. Arendt described Eichmann as a dutiful man, a 
person who, under normal circumstances, wouldn’t have stood out in a 
negative way. After the war, stories were also told about people who had 
acted altruistically under difficult conditions (Oliner & Oliner, 1988).
As a young Ph.D. student, Kohlberg set out to formulate a psycho-
logical explanation of what makes some people act in a pro-social 
manner even in cases where they have no proven advantage from such 
behaviour, or when such behaviour exposes them to danger. Kohlberg 
also wanted to find ways to promote development towards a stable 
tendency to act in a pro-social manner. As a theoretical foundation, he 
chose the paradigm formulated by Jean Piaget a few decades earlier: 
logical constructivism. 
Piaget (1953) describes the child as an active being who explores 
and formulates descriptions of the world that surrounds her; descrip-
tions that may be incorrect, but still appear as logical to the child. 
According to Piaget, the child’s cognitive development should be seen 
as a realisation of an inherent potential. Sensations primarily work as 
incitements that trigger dispositions the child possesses. This focus 
on genes and inborn potential is referred to as nativism in modern 
psychology. Piaget’s nativism also appears in his description of universal 
stages of development. He argues that the child’s capacity to perceive 
and to reason develops from a sensory-motor stage, to a pre-operational 
stage, further to a concrete-operational stage and then terminates 
at a formal-operational stage. Piaget gives an extensive account of 
the child’s capacities and shortcomings at the different stages. When 
it comes to moral reasoning Piaget (1932) distinguishes between a 
pre-moral stage, a stage called moral realism and a stage called moral 
subjectivism. According to Piaget, the child has no clear understanding 
of rules concerning right and wrong until the age of 4. From 4 to 10 
the child assesses actions based on the consequences of the action, and 
not the intention behind it. Piaget calls this moral realism. Children 
who master moral realism are able to learn rules. However, they have 
a rigid understanding of rules, and do not envision that rules may be 
changed. At this stage adults are considered indisputable authorities. 
Piaget argues that at the age of 10 the child usually masters what he 
calls moral subjectivism. At this stage the child assesses actions based 
on the underlying intention. According to Piaget, the child is now able 
to recognise rules as social conventions, in other words as agreements 
that can be changed through a discussion between the parties involved. 
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From the age of 10 the child will also show interest in social issues and 
philosophical questions concerning human welfare.
Kohlberg (1958, 1984) argues that moral reasoning is the central 
source of pro-social actions: the more mature reasoning the stronger 
the inclination to act in a pro-social manner. His theory of moral 
development is a stage theory. He describes a developmental movement 
through a universal, hierarchical series of stages which mark distinct 
changes in the underlying structure of moral reasoning. The three main 
stages in Kohlberg’s model are named as the pre-conventional stage, the 
conventional stage and the post-conventional stage. In some texts the 
last is named the principled stage. Each of these main stages holds two 
sub-stages. 
Pre-conventional reasoning is described as a kind of naïve 
hedonism oriented towards consequences affecting the person him-/
herself. An act is perceived as morally wrong if the person who commits 
it gets punished. Acts that are rewarded are perceived as morally 
right. As the conventional designation expresses, the moral reasoning 
at the second main stage is oriented towards rules and expectations. 
Those who have reached this main stage have an in-group reference. 
At the first sub-stage there is an orientation towards current rules and 
social roles in one’s family and one’s peer group. Acts that imply living 
up to role expectations and result in approval from family members 
or friends are perceived as morally right. At the second sub-stage the 
focus is expanded from the local to the state and to formal legislation. 
Laws are perceived as necessities to maintain a functioning society. 
Therefore, to violate the law is morally wrong. Compared to the theories 
of normative ethics, the reasoning at the conventional stage holds 
elements of heteronymous duty ethics. Post-conventional reasoning has 
a universal reference with the profound realisation that each individual 
possesses inviolable rights. At the first sub-stage, moral reasoning is 
similar to rule utilitarianism. Laws are regarded as social contracts that 
should promote the greatest good for the greatest number of people. 
At the second sub-stage, moral reasoning is similar to that described in 
Kantian duty ethics. 
According to Kohlberg, access to post-conventional reasoning 
implies moral autonomy. Those who have reached the highest stages 
are able to carry out critical reflection on existing rules. These persons 
will reason independently, and reach valid conclusions, also in difficult 
situations where they are exposed to pressure from others. Kohlberg 
claims that it is of the utmost importance to promote development 
towards autonomy because, even in democratic systems, immoral rules 
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may arise, and we may all come to experience extreme situations where 
there is no social contract of rules. When describing the possibility of 
moral autonomy Kohlberg draws heavily on the conceptual framework 
of Kant (1991, 1997). In his texts on ethics Kant argues that we ought to 
act in accordance with those moral rules we can will as universal laws. 
He portrays humans as rational beings with a capacity to formulate 
their own reasonable laws.
Kohlberg was trained as a psychologist and as an empirical 
researcher. However, he builds his theory not only on empirical findings, 
but also on philosophical deliberation. He especially emphasises 
questions of an epistemological and meta-ethical kind. 
In a simplified description meta-ethics can be said to contain two 
major schisms: cognitivism versus non-cognitivism and naturalism 
versus non-naturalism. The disagreement between cognitivists and non-
cognitivists is about whether normative statements can be true, and 
thus whether there is such thing as moral knowledge. While cognitivists 
argue that normative statements may be true and may hold knowledge, 
non-cognitivists reject this possibility. The schism between naturalists 
and non-naturalists deals with inferences from is to ought, that is from 
descriptive premises to normative conclusions. Naturalists argue that 
such inferences may be valid. Non-naturalists claim that such a chain of 
reasoning is a mistake, a mix-up of different spheres, the empirical and 
the moral. They name this alleged mistake a naturalistic fallacy (Moore, 
2004). By ranking different kinds of moral reasoning in a hierarchical 
stage model, Kohlberg claims an isomorphism between mental maturity 
and philosophical validity. This makes him a cognitivist and a naturalist. 
Kohlberg (1981) explained his meta-ethical position in an article with 
the expressive title ‘From is to ought: How to commit the naturalistic 
fallacy and get away with it in the study of moral development.’
According to Kohlberg, one can improve young people’s ability to 
reflect on moral issues by letting them discuss hypothetical dilemma 
situations. He has formulated a number of dilemmas that can be used 
in group discussions. Also, he has given a detailed description of how to 
steer the discussion in the desired direction. After the dilemma situation 
is presented, the young people are asked how the main character in the 
story ought to handle the dilemma, and why this is the right decision. 
The young people then discuss their way to a unanimous conclusion. 
When the conclusion is reached Kohlberg advises the use of the 
so-called Socratic approach (see Brickhouse & Smith, 2009). According 
to Kohlberg, the social pedagogue should recognise the young people’s 
efforts, but at the same time put forward a question that reveals the 
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limitations of their conclusion. The young people may have overlooked 
an important element or entangled themselves in a self-contradiction. 
Kohlberg provides a scientific justification for this traditional 
method by relating it to Piaget’s theory of cognitive development. In 
this theory the concepts ‘assimilation’ and ‘accommodation’ are central. 
Assimilation is the process where the child uses her acquired cognitive 
schemes to make sense of experiences. Accommodation is a comple-
mentary process which involves changing, or expanding, the structure 
of schemes as a result of new information acquired through assimila-
tion. Through accommodation the child moves towards a more mature 
and realistic construction of reality. According to Piaget (1953), the 
child has an inborn need to experience coherence between the different 
parts of the schema structure, and between the schema structure and 
sensations.
Kohlberg explains that young people who are exposed to a story 
containing a moral dilemma will assimilate; they will perceive and 
assess the dilemma by applying their acquired cognitive structure. When 
the pedagogue asks a question that exposes the problems with the 
proposed conclusion, the young people experience a break up in their 
cognitive structure; the coherence is replaced with confusion. According 
to Kohlberg, this state of confusion will work as an incitement to rethink 
the problem and the proposed conclusion. Hopefully, this rethinking 
will lead to accommodation and thereby to a more mature and adequate 
moral reasoning.
Kohlberg is one of the most frequently cited scholars in the field 
of developmental psychology. However, during his lifetime Kohlberg 
experienced criticism from many quarters. One of the critics who 
has achieved most attention is Carol Gilligan (1982). She claims that 
Kohlberg overlooks the differences that exist between how boys and 
girls are raised. According to Gilligan, girls learn to take into account 
the impacts actions may have on others’ feelings. They therefore 
develop a care-perspective. Boys, on the other hand, are raised so that 
they develop a more formal and detached reasoning, focusing on justice.
Elliot Turiel (2006) claims that Kohlberg underestimates children’s 
capacities because he confuses domains with stages. According to 
Turiel, morality and social conventions belong to different domains. 
He argues that children at an early age separate moral rules and social 
conventions. To break a social convention is seen as discourtesy, while 
breaking moral rules is considered wrong in a more serious sense.
Dennis Krebs and Kathy Denton (2005) claim that Kohlberg’s 
model is too simple and therefore only has relevance in pure test 
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situations. According to Krebs and Denton, people in real-life situations 
have a flexible and pragmatic approach to moral dilemmas. If we are in 
a business context and are about to make a contract, we reason in a way 
that differs from the one we apply when we meet vulnerable people and 
are in a caring situation. Also our relationship to the one included in the 
dilemma situation will determine how we reason. 
Arnold Goldstein, Barry Glick and John Gibbs (1998) claim 
that Kohlberg has a one-sided emphasis on maturation and ignores 
the impact of peer influence. In some cases dysfunctional reasoning 
does not reflect immaturity but instead detrimental influence from 
other young people. According to Goldstein, Glick and Gibbs, the 
Kohlbergian perspective should be extended with information 
processing theory. 
There exists an extensive corpus of evidence that the development 
from main stage one to main stage two is universal (Snarey, 1985). 
However, this is not the case for the further development described 
by Kohlberg. Several studies have revealed that post-conventional 
reasoning is more prevalent in urban middle-class communities than in 
rural areas, and more prevalent in Western countries than in non-Western 
countries. These findings have led to a claim that Kohlberg’s theory is 
ethnocentric (Frye, 2000).
As described above, Kohlberg advocates a strong version of the 
stage perspective. Some critics argue that moral development is a 
continuous expansion of the cognitive structure and not qualitative 
leaps in capacity (Rest et al., 1999). 
Like his predecessors in the rationalist tradition, Kohlberg has an 
optimistic belief that mature moral reasoning will bring about pro-social 
actions. Critics hold that the correlation between reasoning and action is 
not as high as claimed by Kohlberg (Blasi, 1980). 
Kohlberg’s sub-stage six as the ultimate way of reasoning has been 
challenged by philosophers. According to Don Locke (1986), moral 
reasoning cannot be measured and ranked like any other reasoning. 
In addition to the objections mentioned above, Kohlberg’s meta-
ethical accounts have prompted serious controversies (Habermas, 1990; 
Locke, 1986). 
Kohlberg and ART
At the end of the twentieth century, many professionals in the field 
of social pedagogy came to know the Kohlbergian approach through 
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a programme called Aggression Replacement Training (ART) (Glick & 
Gibbs, 2011; Goldstein et al., 1998). This is a multimodal programme 
designed to help young people with severe behaviour problems. 
Today the programme is implemented in residential care institutions 
throughout North America, South America, Europe and Australia. 
Endeavours are being made to introduce the programme in still 
more countries. A large number of social pedagogues are qualified as 
instructors within the ART-system and take part in these efforts. 
The ART programme consists of three different courses that are 
run in parallel during the intervention period. Each participant is part 
of a fixed group, a set. Each set contains about ten young people, and 
is led by two social pedagogues. The purpose of the first course is to 
enable the participants to distinguish between different types of social 
situations and equip them with social skills that are adequate in each 
situation. Examples of social skills that young people may need to learn 
are to introduce themselves, to initiate a conversation, to introduce two 
people to each other, to thank, to make a compliment, to ask for help, 
to offer help, to describe feelings, to put forward criticism, to deal with 
criticism and to apologise.
Each gathering starts with an introduction of a social situation 
and a skill that is appropriate in this particular situation. The benefits 
one achieves by applying the actual behaviour are described and 
emphasised. Then the skill is described in detail, point by point, on 
a blackboard or a flip chart. After this the two social pedagogues 
demonstrate the skill in a role play. Finally the participants, in turn, 
carry out a role play where they practise the skill under supervision. The 
young people are encouraged to practise the skills they learn in real-life 
situations.
In the second course the participants learn how to control anger. 
This is an ability that requires multiple skills. First the participants are 
invited to reveal their own dysfunctional styles of thinking, for instance 
a tendency to attribute negative characteristics or intentions to other 
people. Then they learn to identify physical reactions such as trembling 
and increased heart frequency as precursors to an outburst. Through 
role play training these physical reactions are made to work as cues for 
a self-instruction to exercise an adequate social skill. The participants 
are also trained to positively evaluate their own managing of difficult 
situations, situations that before the training ended in an outburst and 
in violence.
The third course in ART is designed to develop young people’s 
capacity for moral reasoning. During the course the group of young 
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people is invited to discuss together 10 different dilemma situations. 
One of the dilemmas is Sam’s problem situation:
Sam and his friend John are shopping in a music store. Sam has 
driven them to the store. John picks up a CD he really likes and 
slips it into his backpack. With a little sign for Sam to follow, John 
then walks out of the store. But Sam doesn’t see John. Moments 
later, the security officer and the store owner come up to Sam. 
The store owner says to the officer, ‘That’s one of the boys who 
were stealing CDs!’ The security officer checks Sam’s backpack but 
doesn’t find a CD. ‘Ok, you’re off the hook, but what’s the name 
of the guy who was with you?’ the officer asks Sam. ‘I’m almost 
broke because of shoplifting,’ the owner says. ‘I can’t let him get 
away with it.’ 
 What should Sam say or do? (Goldstein et al., 1998, p. 312).
The discussions are facilitated by the social pedagogues to maximise 
peer interaction and cognitive conflict, and thereby accommodation. 
When the young people have reached a conclusion which reflects their 
developmental level, the professional applies the Socratic method 
advocated by Kohlberg. The social pedagogue puts forward a question 
which elucidates the limitations of the young people’s accustomed way 
of thinking. The programme manual contains a number of suggestions 
for such questions.
In addition to the use of thought-provoking questions, the 
pedagogues are advised to give a positive assessment of adequate 
statements formulated by the most mature participants, and to some 
extent to ignore inadequate statements. The Kohlbergian method is thus 
supplemented with behaviour modification strategies.
The rationale behind multimodal programmes is that such 
programmes address objections raised about single methods, and 
realise synergies. Methods that have limited impact when applied in 
isolation prove to be effective when they are used in parallel with other 
approaches. By combining several approaches the researchers that have 
developed ART take into consideration several of the objections that 
have been raised against the Kohlbergian tradition. 
It is important to note that it is a modified version of Kohlberg’s 
model that is applied in ART. Main stage three is excluded as a 
pedagogical aim. The ambition professionals seek to realise through 
the programme is development from pre-conventional to conventional 
reasoning. One argument for this modification is the lack of evidence 
 aN altErNativE NEo-KohlbErGiaN aPProaCh iN SoCial PEdaGoGY  37
for post-conventional reasoning as a universal stage (Gibbs, 1995). 
The programme designers have considered it important to stay within 
an empirical-scientific paradigm. ART is supposed to be a neutral 
application of science, an approach to support development in a 
direction given by the child’s inborn disposition.
An Alternative Neo-Kohlbergian Approach
A large number of empirical studies indicate that ART is an effective 
programme in reducing young people’s behavioural problems and 
increasing the occurrence of pro-social behaviour (Goldstein, 2004; 
Gundersen & Svartdal 2006; Nugent et al., 1999). The research carried 
out and the reports from several social pedagogues and psychologists 
give reason to recommend further use of the programme. 
However, it can be argued that the objectives formulated by 
the programme designers are not sufficient. When it comes to moral 
reasoning, there is a need to promote development beyond a level 
where prevailing expectations and rules make up the chief components. 
Reports from previous and contemporary conflict areas reveal the need 
to promote readiness for the most difficult situations. In addition, 
even well-functioning societies may hold conventions that should be 
challenged. 
As described above, the developmental movement from main 
stage two to main stage three is not verified as universal, and philo-
sophical arguments can be raised against Kohlberg’s sub-stage six as an 
ultimate way of reasoning in every kind of dilemma situation. Together 
with a group of co-researchers, James Rest has introduced an alternative 
definition of post-conventional reasoning (Rest et al., 1999). This 
definition is not based on a ranking of normative theories as maturation 
stages. Instead, normative theories are seen more as alternative tools 
which have relevance in different kinds of problem situations. According 
to Rest and his colleagues, to reach the post-conventional stage implies 
a capacity to alternate between several different ways of reasoning. 
Mark Tappan (1997, 1998, 2006) has developed the position 
of Rest and his colleagues further by proposing a synthesis between 
Kohlberg’s theory and a socio-cultural perspective. Tappan is influenced 
by the pioneering work of Lev Vygotsky (1962) and the works of 
successors such as James Wertsch (1998). Vygotsky emphasises the 
role of language as a tool of thought. He claims that all kinds of higher 
psychological functioning must involve the use of language, and that 
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the child at an early age applies acquired words and syntactical forms in 
her reasoning. Vygotsky thus opposes Piaget’s description of ‘egocentric 
speech’ which can be observed in early childhood as an epiphenomenon 
of the child’s egocentric thinking. He claims that these monologues are 
verbal reasoning voiced out loud, and not utterances directed towards 
others. Later the child’s thinking becomes soundless, but it continues to 
be formulated in words and sentences. 
Vygotsky claims that to some extent the syntax of inner verbal 
reasoning differs from the syntax of external social speech. Compared 
to external speech, inner speech appears incomplete, holding several 
abbreviations and short-cuts. However, the words, concepts, syntactical 
forms and discourses of social language are prerequisites for inner 
verbal reasoning. According to Vygotsky, human mental functioning 
is shaped by how the physical and social reality is categorised in the 
particular language we learn. Therefore, followers of Vygotsky’s theory 
claim that a path is a better metaphor for development than stairs or a 
ladder. Cognitive development implies following one of several possible 
paths to one of several possible terminal points (Rogoff, 1990). 
As one of Kohlberg’s former students, Tappan acknowledges 
the importance of maturation. However, he holds that the theories 
of normative ethics should be regarded as artefacts; descriptions 
formulated by human beings, and imparted from person to person. Such 
a perspective makes up a foundation for what is referred to as the ethical 
turn. In recent decades there has been an increasing interest in ethics. 
Many people apply normative ethics to handle dilemma situations, both 
in their everyday life and in their professional life. A large number of 
readers and academic textbooks presenting ethics have been published, 
and on several study programmes at universities students attend courses 
dealing with ethics. In addition to a presentation of descriptive ethics, 
meta-ethics and normative ethics, the students are given the opportunity 
to apply the theories of normative ethics to imagined cases in the field 
of professional practice. The inducement put forward for initiating 
students into the field of ethics is an optimistic belief that these insights 
will improve students’ ability to deal with dilemmas (Beauchamp & 
Bowie, 2004; Davis et al., 1997; Howe & Miramontes, 1992). Normative 
theories are claimed to be a kind of linguistic and cognitive toolset that 
can be used to identify and clarify moral problems. In a book for the 
health professions Ruth Purtilo states that normative theories ‘become 
the basic starting point for our ethical deliberation’ (1993, p. 11). 
In general, the presentations the students are exposed to in 
lectures and texts have an explicit form. The theories are presented 
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as distinct models and approaches that can be applied to concrete 
dilemmas. The students also learn who formulated the theories, and 
therefore can refer to relevant philosophers such as Aristotle, Bentham, 
Kant, MacIntyre and Rawls. This explicit imparting represents a contrast 
to the maturation-support approach proposed by Kohlberg.
According to Tappan, normative ethics can be imparted explicitly 
to young people in much the same way as ethics are taught to 
grown-up students. He claims that young people who acquire insight 
into normative ethics will recognise these theories as tools to use in 
resolving dilemmas they are confronted with in their everyday lives. 
As an example, he describes an interview with an 18-year-old student 
taking a moral philosophy course. When she is asked to describe and 
elaborate on a real-life dilemma she has experienced, she uses words 
and forms of discourses from the texts she has read. As an example, she 
puts forward what she refers to as her ‘Kantian point of view’ (Tappan, 
2006, p. 1). According to Tappan, the student’s response to moral 
dilemmas has become more complex and sophisticated, because she 
is able to apply normative ethics. By learning several ways of moral 
reasoning she has gradually appropriated a variety of cognitive tools to 
alternate between and has gained proficiency in dealing with different 
dilemma situations.
In developmental psychology there has been a schism between 
those scholars who emphasise children’s shortcomings when it comes 
to cognitive capacity and those who claim that children are able to 
deal with complicated issues. The former position is to a large extent 
based on the early works of Piaget. He was the first to formulate an 
overall theory about cognitive development. In contemporary research 
reviews, central elements of the theory are still recognised as verified 
knowledge. However, there is also a consensus that Piaget underesti-
mated children’s capacities. Children seem to master abstract concepts 
and abstract reasoning earlier than described by the early Piaget 
(Deloache et al., 1998).
Another central schism in developmental psychology is indirectly 
described on the preceding pages. This is the schism between those 
scholars who describe development as first and foremost a maturation 
process, meaning realisation of inborn dispositions, and those who 
emphasise pedagogical efforts. This schism is often referred to as the 
nature versus nurture debate or as the nativism versus empiricism 
debate. Scholars from the former position often use a seed or a 
flower as a metaphor to portray the child. Some of those supporting 
the latter position use tabula rasa, a blank slate, as a metaphor. 
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Nature versus nurture should not be seen as a dichotomy, but should 
instead be seen as a continuous variable. Between the two extremes 
there are a number of positions. Several research reviews conclude 
that there is a lack of evidence for a radical version of nativism, 
so-called strong nativism (Aber et al., 2012; Deloache et al.,1998; 
Roberts et al., 2008; Rogoff, 1998). Genetic dispositions are of great 
importance, but development is also to a large extent an enculturation 
process. 
These consensuses in contemporary research reviews give reason 
to further explore an explicit imparting of ethics as proposed by Tappan. 
This may turn out to be a viable approach in the field of social pedagogy, 
and an adequate supplement to ART. 
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